The Civil False Claims Act and its Unreasonably Broad Scope of Liability: The Need for Real  Clarifications  Following the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 by Winkler, Ryan
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2012
The Civil False Claims Act and its Unreasonably
Broad Scope of Liability: The Need for Real
"Clarifications" Following the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009
Ryan Winkler
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Government Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, The Civil False Claims Act and its Unreasonably Broad Scope of Liability: The Need for Real "Clarifications" Following the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 533 (2012)
 
 
 
533 
THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND ITS 
UNREASONABLY BROAD SCOPE OF LIABILITY: 
THE NEED FOR REAL “CLARIFICATIONS” 
FOLLOWING THE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND 
RECOVERY ACT OF 2009 
RYAN WINKLER* 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 534 
 II. BACKGROUND ..................................................................... 537 
A. Lincoln’s Law: The Inception of the False Claims Act 537 
B. 1943 Amendments: Extinguishing the Parasites ......... 538 
C. 1986 Amendments: Removing Barriers for Qui Tam  
 Plaintiffs and the Government ..................................... 538 
D. The False Claims Act and Relevant Decisions Prior to  
 the 2009 Amendments .................................................. 540 
1. The “Presentment Requirement”: Totten v.  
 Bombardier Corporation ...................................... 540 
2. To Get, or Not To Get: The “Intent” Requirement  
 of Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel.  
 Sanders ................................................................. 541 
E. The Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of 2009:  
 “Clarifications to the False Claims Act” .................... 543 
1. Congress’ Removal of Allison Engine’s “Intent”  
 Requirement ......................................................... 543 
2. FERA’s Expansion of the “Reverse False Claims”  
 Provision of the FCA. ........................................... 544 
F. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of  
 2010 ............................................................................. 545 
 III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S SHIFT TOWARD A NEGLIGENCE  
  STANDARD: THE INEVITABLE ESCALATION OF  
  TRANSACTIONAL COSTS AND NECESSARY CHANGES. ......... 547 
A. The False Claims Act and its Shift Toward a Negligence  
 Standard....................................................................... 547 
1. Negligent Compliance and Voluntary Disclosure .. 548 
                                                           
 * J.D. expected 2012, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; 
B.S. The Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business.  Thank you to Mark Chilson for 
his initial suggestion and continued guidance on this topic. Thank you, also, to Professor Alex 
Frondorf for his thoughtful insights and suggestions.  And a heartfelt thanks to my mother, 
Claire Chilson, for her never-ending love, support, and inspiration. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
534 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:533 
2. Reasonable Belief of Compliance ........................ 550 
3. Negligent Returns of Government Overpayments 551 
a. What Constitutes an “Obligation”? .............. 552 
b. When are Funds “Improperly” Retained? .... 553 
c. What Does it Mean to Have “Identified” an  
 Overpayment? ............................................... 554 
B. Raising the Cost of Doing Business with Both  
 Contractors and the Government ................................ 554 
C. Implicit Negligence Standard Causes Other Policy  
 Implications and Unwarranted Burdens ..................... 556 
 IV. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A  
  POTENT, YET MORE EFFICIENT WEAPON TO COMBAT  
  FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ................................... 557 
 V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 558 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two companies face serious legal action that could put them out of business. 
Metal-Maven, Inc., a metal fabrication company, is under contract with the 
United States Air Force to fabricate specialty screws that the federal government will 
use to construct a new military aircraft, the Blackbird.  Pursuant to the contract, 
Metal-Maven is to produce 500 sets of screws, one for each new aircraft.  The 
government will pay Metal-Maven $10,000 for each set.  The specifications of the 
contract call for Metal-Maven to use titanium, which is lighter and stronger than 
steel, to fabricate the screws to be used on the aircraft.  Titanium, however, is more 
expensive than steel.  In an attempt to maximize profit, Metal-Maven orders from a 
subcontractor enough steel to produce the 500 sets of screws, instead of the agreed 
upon titanium.   
The steel screws prove no match for the abuse the new Blackbirds must endure, 
and cause several performance issues for the Air Force.  The weight of the steel 
screws hinders the Blackbirds’ ability to reach desired speeds; the steel screws, very 
early on, begin to rust; and, eventually, many of the screws begin to buckle under the 
wind pressure caused by the high rates of speed of the Blackbirds.  The United States 
Attorney General, based on information brought forth by a whistle-blowing1 Metal-
Maven employee, files suit against Metal-Maven for defrauding the government 
under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).   
Reliable Rubber Manufacturers (“Reliable”) processes and produces rubber 
pieces for a variety of purposes.  Reliable’s most recent contract calls for it to 
                                                           
 1 “Whistleblower” is a term often used to describe an employee, present or former, who 
brings information regarding his employer’s wrongful conduct to the attention of the 
government, acting as a third-party plaintiff.  Similarly, “relator” is another legal term of art 
describing the third-party informant involved in False Claims litigation.  The term “relator,” 
however, is applied to all third-party plaintiffs, not just past or present employees of the 
offender.  For purposes of this Note, both whistleblower and relator describe third-party 
plaintiffs in False Claims Act litigation who bring information regarding the “false claims” to 
the government’s attention. 
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produce rubber tubing to be used on lifeboats.  Lasting Lifeboats, LLC is 
manufacturing 5,000 lifeboats for the United States Navy, and has subcontracted 
with Reliable to produce the customized tubing; Reliable is to be compensated 
$1,000 for each unique piece.  The specifications for the boats, expressed in the 
contracts between all three entities, call for three-quarter inch tubes.   
While prudently performing its duties, Reliable noticed that its rubber-processing 
machine was malfunctioning.  Reliable called a licensed and highly credible machine 
servicing company to repair the equipment.  The machine was recalibrated and the 
repairs were complete.  According to the repair company, the machine was now 
processing three-quarter inch rubber tubing.  As far as Reliable knew, it completed 
the order for the tubing according to specification and sent it off to Lasting 
Lifeboats.  Lasting Lifeboats affixed the rubber piece to its boats and sent them off 
to the Navy.  The Navy, however, quickly receives information from a third party 
that the tubing measures only seven-tenths of an inch in diameter and will not be 
sufficient for its purposes.  As a result, the United States Attorney General files a 
False Claims action against Reliable for “knowingly” defrauding the government. 
At first glance, both companies appear to be on the hook for roughly $5,000,000 
in damages.2  The FCA, however, imposes treble damages,3 bringing each 
company’s total liability to $15,000,000.  On top of that, each party may be liable for 
between $5,000 and $10,000 per claim.4  If Metal-Maven submitted 500 claims for 
reimbursement—one per set of screws—it could be held liable for an additional 
$5,000,000.  Reliable, on the other hand, presuming it filed separate claims for each 
of the 5,000 lifeboats – may be held liable for an additional $50,000,000. 
The False Claims Act was intended to hold parties liable, like Metal-Maven, who 
purposefully defraud the government.  That is, only those with the requisite scienter5 
should be held liable.  Attaching liability to such action has recovered billions of the 
federal government’s misappropriated dollars.  The FCA was not intended to attach 
liability to mere negligent activity.6  Presumably, companies like Reliable will learn 
their lesson through a simple negligence or breach of contract claim.   
                                                           
 2 In Metal-Maven’s case, 500 sets of screws multiplied by its compensation, $10,000 per 
set, results in $5,000,000.  Reliable produced 5,000 rubber pieces at a rate of $1,000 per unit, 
resulting in $5,000,000.  Presumably, if sued under breach of contract, both companies would 
be liable for $5,000,000 in restitution. 
 3 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2010) (stating that defendants are 
liable for three times the amount of damages the government sustains because of the 
defendant). 
 4 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2010); see also CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, § 7:2 (2004) (The text of the False Claims 
Act sets forth “a mandatory civil penalty of ‘not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000’ 
for each violation of the Act.”    In addition, “[u]nder the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 
1996, these penalties must be adjusted for inflation every four years and are currently set at 
$5,500-$11,000.”). 
 5 For purposes of this Note, “scienter” is a legal term of art referring to the requisite state 
of mind for an offender to be found liable under the FCA. 
 6 See United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
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Attaching FCA liability in such circumstances, like Reliable Rubber’s, can 
cripple entities that never intended to defraud the government.  Attaching liability to 
mere negligence under the FCA, although Congress denies the Act’s intention to do 
so,7 carries with it a number of devastating implications for the government, 
contractors, and the public as a whole.  Additionally, it hardly provides for a 
deterrent to mere negligence.  This Note discusses this unresolved issue and focuses 
on the confusion surrounding the necessary state of mind for effectuating liability 
under the FCA.8 
This Note analyzes Congress’s most recent attempts to recover fraudulently 
secured government funds through its modifications of the False Claims Act 
(“FCA”), and concludes that an amendment to the Act is necessary.  To begin, Part 
II.A. presents a brief historical tracking of the FCA, including the original FCA of 
1863,9 and the critical amendments through 1986.  Part II.B. explores relevant 
interpretations by the courts that established the landscape of false claims litigation 
prior to the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”), including 
Allison Engine v. United States ex. rel. Sanders, in which the United States Supreme 
Court reversed a presentment requirement and articulated an intent requirement for 
defendant liability.10  Part II.C. details the recent, though significant, alterations to 
the FCA, including FERA’s effective overruling of Allison Engine and removal of 
any intent requirement.  This Note will briefly explain the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010, its erosion of the “Public Disclosure Bar,” and its 
narrow definition of “publicly disclosed” information. 
Part III.A. highlights current examples that demonstrate the FCA’s inevitable 
shift toward a negligence standard if the Act is not further clarified.  Part III.B. will 
show the serious repercussions that necessarily follow such a broadened scope of 
liability, such as an increased cost of doing business with the government and 
contractors, and several policy implications.  Finally, Part III.C. will explain that 
Congress must adopt the approach of several state versions of the False Claims Act, 
and expressly eliminate negligence and mistake as bases for liability under the 
federal False Claims Act. 
                                                           
 7 See 132 CONG. REC. S11244 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986). 
 8 The expanded liability under the False Claims Act that is discussed in this Note is most 
threatening to the health care industry.  In fact, the real-world examples used in this Note’s 
analysis deal with the risks posed to the health care industry.  For purposes of clarity, the 
hypothetical examples in the introduction of this Note involve military contracting, as the 
extreme complexities involved with the health care system, including its coding procedures, 
become befuddling.    The general principles, however, apply equally in all government-
contracting settings. 
 9 See Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696, 696-99 (1863) (current version at 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2009)). 
 10 See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Lincoln’s Law: The Inception of the False Claims Act 
In 1863, Congress enacted Lincoln’s Law, the original False Claims Act, in 
response to increasing fraud among Union contractors during the Civil War.11  In 
one such example, according to the legislative history, a contractor sold and 
delivered boxes of sawdust to Union cavalry, who were expecting muskets.12  The 
FCA incorporated qui tam provisions—Latin for “who as well for the king as for 
himself sues in this matter”13—permitting private plaintiffs, or “relators,” to bring 
civil action against an FCA offender on the government’s behalf.  The qui tam 
provisions were introduced to greatly increase the government’s capacity to combat 
fraud,14 effectively offering rewards for information to which it would not otherwise 
have access.15  Qui tam provisions were especially useful at the time given that 
“federal and state governments were fairly small and unable to devote significant 
resources to law enforcement.”16  As the role of Government swelled, though, the 
use of qui tam provisions did not subside.17  A respected scholar noted that “[t]he 
war called for a dramatic escalation in the role of national government and this too 
was reflected in many ways in every part of the law.”18  Specifically, the Civil War 
                                                           
 11 ABA, Section of Public Contract Law, Procurement Fraud Committee, QUI TAM 
LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, 1 (2d ed. 1999); see also An Act to Prevent and 
Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) 
[hereinafter “Original False Claims Act”] (As it was written in 1863, the False Claims Act 
held liable any person “who shall make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be 
presented for payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the civil or military service 
of the United States, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States . . . 
knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent.”).  
 12 See 132 CONG. REC. H6479, H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986). 
 13 Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009). 
 14 See Note, Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private 
Litigant in Public Actions, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 446, 453 (1972). 
 15 For example: 
The effect of [the qui tam provision] is simply to hold out to a confederate a 
strong temptation to betray his coconspirator, and bring him to justice.  The bill 
offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court and betrays his 
coconspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to that class. . . . In short, sir, 
I have based the [qui tam provisions] upon the old-fashioned idea of holding 
out a temptation and “setting a rogue to catch a rogue,” which is the safest and 
most expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice. 
CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955-56 (1863). 
 16 SYLVIA, supra note 4, at § 2:6. 
 17 Id. (“As the role of the Government expanded, the utility of private assistance in law 
enforcement did not diminish.  If anything, changes in the role and size of the Government 
created a greater role for this method of law enforcement.”).   
 18 Id. (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 295 (1973)). 
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created an intense demand for war supplies, which in turn created more opportunity 
for fraud.19 
B.  1943 Amendments: Extinguishing the Parasites 
The FCA was significantly altered only once between its inception and 1986.  In 
1943, several changes were made to the FCA.  Among other things, the 1943 
amendments bestowed upon the Department of Justice the ability to take over cases 
initiated by qui tam relators.20  Furthermore, the 1943 amendments impeded qui tam 
relators’ ability to bring action and reduced potential damages they may be 
awarded.21  Perhaps the most momentous of the 1943 amendments required a qui 
tam relator to base his suit on information that the government did not already 
possess.22  In passing this amendment, Congress nullified the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, which allowed for qui tam relators 
to bring “parasitical” actions based on information already made public by the 
government.23  After 1943, a relator could no longer replicate the government’s 
indictment by acting as a parasite to recover a portion of the damages.  Here, 
Congress’s intent was to prevent relators from piggy-backing on information the 
government already possessed, thereby taking advantage of the qui tam provision for 
personal financial gain without contributing anything to the government’s 
enforcement efforts. 
C.  1986 Amendments: Removing Barriers for Qui Tam Plaintiffs and the 
Government 
By 1986, Congress and legal scholars24 had expressed an escalating concern that 
the FCA was doing too little to prevent fraud in government contracting.25  For 
instance, the Department of Defense noted that, as of 1985, forty-five of the one 
hundred largest defense contractors were being investigated for “multiple fraud 
offenses.”26  Congress responded by demolishing many of the barriers that the 1943 
revisions placed on qui tam relators.27  Consequently, relators—aptly nicknamed 
“whistleblowers”—had increased incentive to bring action,28 were afforded greater 
                                                           
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at § 2:8.  
 21 See MICHAEL A. BRANCA, AARON P. SILBERMAN & JOHN S. VENTO, FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 728 (2d ed. 2010) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266). 
 22 See False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608, 608-09 (1943). 
 23 See Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims Amendments Act of 
1986: The Need for Clear Legislative Expression, 42 CATH. U. L. Rev. 935, 936 (1992-93) 
(citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943)). 
 24 SYLVIA, supra note 4, at § 2:9. 
 25 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986). 
 26 Id.  
 27 See ABA, Section of Public Contract Law, Procurement Fraud Committee, QUI TAM 
LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, 2-3 (2d ed. 1999). 
 28 Id. 
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employment discrimination protection,29 were awarded higher bounties,30 and now 
faced a lower burden of proof to show violation of the FCA.31  In contrast to the 
1943 Amendments, whistleblowers could now bring suit even if the government 
already possessed the information, provided the whistleblower was the “original 
source.”32  Finally, qui tam plaintiffs were now entitled to between fifteen and thirty 
percent of the government’s recovery.33  In addition, defendants were liable for 
treble damages34 and a $5,000 to $10,000 fine per false claim.35 
It is clear that Congress intended to revitalize the FCA through its 1986 
amendments.  Describing the intent behind the amendments, a representative of a 
supporting business association stated that the 1986 amendments were: 
supportive of improved integrity in [government] contracting.  The bill 
adds no new layers of bureaucracy, new regulations, or new Federal 
police powers.  Instead, the bill takes the sensible approach of increasing 
penalties for wrongdoing, and rewarding those private individuals who 
take significant personal risk to bring such wrongdoing to light.36 
(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, during the Senate hearings, Congressman Berman explained, “the Act 
was not intended to apply to mere negligence.”37  Berman did, however, posit that 
                                                           
 29 Id.   
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. 
 32 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2010); see also Purcell, supra note 23, at 936.  “A 
person is an original source if he had some of the information related to the claim which he 
made available to the government or the news media in advance of the false claim being 
publicly disclosed.”  132 CONG. REC. 29322 (1986).  
 33 See id.  
 34 To reiterate, the treble damages provision requires a court to award the plaintiff three 
times the amount of actual or compensatory damages. 
 35 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2010). 
 36 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 14 (1986). 
 37 Explaining the new FCA standard for liability, Congressman Berman stated: 
It expressly acknowledges that no proof of specific intent to defraud the government is 
required.  There have been some erroneous court decisions that have misapplied the 
law in the past to require an intent to defraud.  The language defined in this section of 
the law is entered to clarify what has been the law which has been properly interpreted 
in the case of United States v. Cooperative Grain and Supply.  Subsection 3 of Section 
3729(c) uses the term “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” 
which is no different than and has the same meaning as a gross negligence standard 
that has been applied in other cases.  While the Act was not intended to apply to mere 
negligence, it is intended to apply in situations that could be considered gross 
negligence where the submitted claims to the Government are prepared in such a 
sloppy or unsupervised fashion that resulted [sic] in overcharges to the Government.  
The Act is also intended not to permit artful defense counsel to require some form of 
intent as an essential ingredient of proof.  This section is intended to reach the 
“ostrich-with-his-head-in-the-sand” problem where government contractors hide 
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the amendments were “intended to apply in situations that could be considered gross 
negligence where . . . claims to the Government are . . . sloppy or unsupervised.”38 
D.  The False Claims Act and Relevant Decisions Prior to the 2009 Amendments 
Confusion has historically surrounded the False Claims Act.  In its pre-2009 
form, the FCA made liable any person39 that knowingly presented a false or 
fraudulent claim40 or knowingly made “a false record or statement to get a false or 
fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.”41  A person, or corporation, 
acted “knowingly” if that person had “actual knowledge,”42 acted in “deliberate 
ignorance” of the information43, or acted in “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity 
of the information.”44  
1.  The “Presentment Requirement”: Totten v. Bombardier Corporation 
In United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., liability hinged on 
Bombardier’s presentation of invoices seeking payment from an account that 
contained government funds.45  Relator Totten sued Bombardier Corporation and 
Envirovac, Inc., alleging violation of the FCA46 for delivering defective rail cars to 
Amtrak, and submitting invoices to Amtrak for payment from a federally funded 
                                                           
behind the fact they were not personally aware that such overcharges may have 
occurred. 
132 CONG. REC. H9382 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (citation omitted).  But the court’s holding in 
United States v. Coop. Grain & Supply Co. seems contradictory: 
Since the False Claims Act is civil in nature, the definition of “knowingly” should be 
the definition as applied in the civil action of misrepresentation.  Prosser classifies 
misrepresentation into “the three familiar tort classifications of intent, negligence and 
strict responsibility.”  Since we have decided that a false claim, not only a fraudulent 
claim, is actionable under the Act, a negligent misrepresentation can constitute the 
necessary “knowledge.”  Prosser says that “[A] representation made with a honest 
belief in its truth may still be negligent because a lack of reasonable care in 
ascertaining the facts.”  
United States v. Coop. Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 60 (8th Cir. 1973) (citations 
omitted). 
 38 132 CONG. REC. H9382 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986). 
 39 For purposes of this Note, a corporation is considered a “person.”  See SYLVIA, supra 
note 4, at § 4:70 (“Corporations are presumptively persons under the False Claims Act.”).  
 40 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 1994) (amended 2009). 
 41 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(2) (West 1994) (amended 2009) (emphasis added). 
 42 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1) (West 1994) (amended 2009). 
 43 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2) (West 1994) (amended 2009). 
 44 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(3) (West 1994) (amended 2009). 
 45 United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(holding that submission of false claims to Amtrak did not constitute a violation because the 
claim was not presented to the Government). 
 46 See id.  Relator Totten brought his claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). 
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account.47  The D.C. Circuit held that Bombardier’s claim must be “presented to an 
officer or employee of the government before liability can attach.”48  According to 
the court, because Amtrak was not a government entity, Bombardier and Envirovac 
had not “presented” a false claim “to the Government.”49  Consequently, liability 
could not attach and Bombardier’s activity was not actionable under the FCA.50  
Totten established what many have been termed the “presentment” requirement.51  
2.  To Get, or Not To Get: The “Intent” Requirement of Allison Engine Co. v. United 
States ex rel. Sanders 
Four years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited the “presentment” 
requirement,52 and addressed whether an FCA defendant must intend for the 
fraudulent claims to be paid by the Government.53  In Allison Engine Co. v. United 
States ex rel. Sanders, the United States Navy contracted with two shipbuilders to 
assemble a fleet of missile destroyers.54  The shipbuilders subcontracted with 
petitioner Allison Engine to build ninety generator sets for the destroyers.55  Allison 
Engine then subcontracted with petitioner General Tool to assemble the generator 
sets, who, in turn, subcontracted with petitioner Southern Ohio Fabricators Company 
(“SOFCO”) to make enclosures for the sets.56  The Navy specified in its contract 
with the shipyards that every part produced for the destroyers was to be in strict 
compliance with military standards.57  All of the Navy’s standards were expressed in 
each subcontract.58   
                                                           
 47 See id.  
 48 Id. 
 49 See id. at 491-92. 
 50 Id. at 493. 
 51 Before 1986, questions arose as to whether false claims submitted to quasi-
governmental entities constituted submission of a claim to the “United States Government,” 
pursuant to the False Claims Act.  See, e.g., Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 
(1958) (holding that the Commodity Credit Corporation was a part of the United States 
Government for purposes of the False Claims Act); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 
598 (1958) (holding that the Federal Housing Authority was part of the Government for 
purposes of the False Claims Act); United States ex rel. Salzman v. Salant & Salant, 41 F. 
Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that the Red Cross was not part of the Government 
for purposes of the False Claims Act). 
 52 See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 668-69 (2008).  
Note that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in implementing the intent requirement 
was unanimous.  
 53 Id. at 665. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 666. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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Ten years after the contracts were formed, two former employees of General 
Tool brought suit under § 3729 of the FCA in the District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio.59  The two whistleblowers alleged that Allison Engine, General 
Tool, and SOFCO submitted invoices to the shipyards that “fraudulently sought 
payment for work that had not been done in accordance with contract 
specifications.”60  The District Court granted the companies judgment as a matter of 
law because the whistleblowers failed to show that the false or fraudulent claim was 
ever presented to the Navy.61  While the Sixth Circuit agreed that “liability under § 
3279(a)(1) requires proof that a false claim was presented to the Government,” it 
reversed the District Court in relevant part.62  The Sixth Circuit held that claims 
under § 3729(a)(2) and (3) “do not require proof of an intent to cause a false claim to 
be paid by the Government,” and that “proof of intent to cause a false claim to be 
paid by a private entity using Government funds was sufficient.”63 
The United States Supreme Court reversed.64  First, the Court implicitly 
overturned Totten and found that the claim need not be presented directly to the 
government.65  The Court held, however, that the false statement must be made with 
the intention that it will be relied upon by the government in paying, or approving 
payment of, a claim.66  A subcontractor is not liable for submitting false claims to a 
prime contractor, unless the subcontractor does so with the intent that the claim is to 
be paid by the federal government.67  
In its analysis, the Court marshaled the specific language of § 3729(a)(2), 
holding that “to get” a false claim paid “by the Government” indicated an intent 
requirement.68  In other words, the mere fact that government funds were used was 
insufficient to attach liability.  Rather, the false claim must intend to defraud the 
government.  The Court reasoned that, without such a requirement, the FCA would 
become “an all-purpose anti-fraud statute.”69  Moreover, “[e]liminating this element 
                                                           
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 667. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 667-68.  The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that liability under § 
3729(a)(1) requires proof that the claim was presented to the government.  The appellate 
court, however, held that § 3729(a)(2) and (3) did not require intent to defraud to attach 
liability. 
 63 Id. at 668. 
 64 Id. at 673. 
 65 Id. at 672. 
 66 Id. at 672-73. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 668 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (1986), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 
4(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1622 (2009)). 
 69 Id. at 672. 
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of intent . . . would expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of combating 
‘fraud against the Government.’”70 
E.  The Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of 2009: “Clarifications to the False 
Claims Act” 
In May of 2009, President Obama signed into effect the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”),71 its primary purpose being to address the current 
crises of financial institution fraud and fraud against federal relief programs.  In the 
process, FERA slipped several crucial amendments to the FCA into the bill.72  For 
instance, FERA overruled Allison Engine’s intent requirement.  In relevant part,73 
FERA set out to “clarify” portions of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), the act 
originally enacted as the government’s response to abuses by private supply 
contractors during the Civil War.74  While FERA made numerous adjustments to the 
FCA, this Note primarily focuses on FERA’s removal of the so-called “intent” 
requirement,75 FERA’s expansion of liability under the “reverse false claims” 
provision, and the FCA’s inevitable trend toward a negligence standard.  
1.  Congress’ Removal of Allison Engine’s “Intent” Requirement  
As mentioned above, the Court in Allison Engine held that “to get” a claim paid 
by the Government denotes purpose and intent.76  In response to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Allison Engine, Congress amended the language in § 3729(a)(2) 
of the FCA.77  Congress removed the “to get” language, and now requires only that 
                                                           
 70 Id. at 669 (quoting Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958)) (emphasis in 
Allison Engine). 
 71 Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 
 72 See id. 
 73 See generally, S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10-12 (2009).  The Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009 amended, inter alia, a fraud statute to protect funds under the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program and economic stimulus package, the federal securities statute, and the 
federal money laundering statutes.  For purposes of this Note, however, only the amendments 
to the False Claims Act are relevant. 
 74 J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555 (2000). 
 75 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West 2010).  As originally enacted in 1863, this section 
imposed liability on a person “who shall, for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, 
the approval or payment of such claim, make, use, or cause to be made or used, any false bill, 
receipt, voucher, entry, roll, account, claim, statement, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, 
knowing the same to contain any false or fraudulent statement or entry.” Act of Mar. 2, 1863, 
§ 1, 12 Stat. 696, 697. Congress later eliminated a number of the references to the various 
types of records or statements for consistency with other sections of the Code. See Pub. L. No. 
97-258, 96 Stat. 978 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-651 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1895, 2037. In 2009, Congress eliminated the references to getting a claim paid, or the 
purpose of the record. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 
 76 See supra Part II.D.2. 
 77 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 
(2009). 
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the false record or statement be “material to” the false or fraudulent claim.78  
Similarly, Congress further “clarified” the FCA by officially ridding the statute of 
any language that might indicate a “presentment” requirement.79  Congress defined 
the term “material” to mean “having a natural tendency to influence, or being 
capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”80   
To cap things off, FERA modified the FCA’s definition of “claim,” which now 
reads, “any request or demand . . . for money or property . . . whether or not the 
United States has title to the money or property . . . if the money or property is to be 
spent or used on the government’s behalf or to advance a government program or 
interest.”81  In sum, liability may now attach even when FCA defendants neither 
present a false claim directly to the government, nor present a false claim with the 
intent of defrauding the government.82 
2.  FERA’s Expansion of the “Reverse False Claims” Provision of the FCA 
A whistleblower also has the so-called “reverse false claims” provision of the 
False Claims Act at its disposal.83  A reverse false claim, post-FERA, transpires 
when an entity “knowingly” makes a false statement to avoid or decrease an 
“obligation” to pay the Government, as opposed to making false statements to 
increase the amount of money it receives from the Government.84  An “obligation,” a 
term previously interpreted by the courts, now means “an established duty, whether 
or not fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual . . . relationship . . . or 
from the retention of any overpayment.”85  Thus, the “reverse false claims” provision 
                                                           
 78 S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 (2009) (“To correct the Allison Engine decision . . . [i]n 
section 3729(a)(2) the words ‘to get’ were removed striking the language the Supreme Court 
found created an intent requirement for false claims liability under that section.”). 
 79 Id. (“[T]he language ‘paid or approved by the Government’ was removed to address 
both the decision in Allison Engine, and to prevent a new ‘presentment’ requirement from 
being read into the section.”). 
 80 Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2009)).  Contra United States ex rel. Conner v. 
Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., 543 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying a much narrower 
definition of “materiality” than the definition provided by FERA). 
 81 Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1617, 1621 (2009). 
 82 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West 2010). 
 83 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West 2010) (formerly codified as 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a)(7)). 
 84 Id.  Prior to the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, the “reverse false 
claims” provision held liable any person that “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or 
used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government.”  Upon enactment of FERA, the provision holds liable 
any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or 
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, 
or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay 
or transmit money or property to the Government.” (emphasis added). 
 85 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(3) (West 2010). 
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now attaches liability to potential or contingent duties to repay,86 not just those 
previously fixed or determined.87  
In addition, an affirmative statement88 is no longer necessary to invoke liability 
under the “reverse false claims” provision because it now makes liable any person 
who “knowingly conceals or . . . avoids or decreases an obligation to pay.”89  As a 
result, merely retaining an overpayment, without more, could presumably lead not 
only to the obligation to restore the Government to its original position, but could 
also trigger treble damages and penalties.  At the very least, FERA’s ambiguous 
definition of “obligation” prompts the question: When can an “established duty” 
arise from “retention of an overpayment,” other than from “a contractual, grantor-
grantee, licensor-licensee, fee-based or similar relationship, or a statute or a 
regulation”?90  Because whistleblowers no longer need to prove an affirmative act 
for a defendant to be subject to FCA liability, FERA will necessarily open the door 
to more fruitless, wasteful litigation.  In addition, these changes further exemplify 
the FCA’s shift toward a negligence standard of liability. 
F.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
In another effort to reverse the judicial trend of limiting qui tam actions under the 
FCA, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (“PPACA”) in March of 2010.91  Of chief importance is the PPACA’s erosion of 
the “Public Disclosure Bar.”92  The FCA now reads that “the Court shall dismiss an 
action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if 
                                                           
 86 S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 14 (2009) (“The term ‘obligation’ is now defined under new 
Section 3729(b)(3) and includes fixed and contingent duties owed to the Government– 
including fixed liquidated obligations such as judgments, and fixed, unliquidated obligations 
such as tariffs on imported goods.”) (emphasis added). 
 87 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Co., 520 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2008); 
U.S. ex rel. Bain v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 386 F.3d 648, 657 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to interpret “obligation” to 
include potential or contingent obligations, requiring instead that the obligation be fixed at the 
time of the allegedly false claim). 
 88 See Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew T. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm: The New False 
Claims Act Amendments and Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, 21 HEALTH 
LAW. 14, 18 (2009) (noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee on FERA states that the 
revised provision is aimed at imposing liability “without notice [by the provider] to the 
Government about the overpayment” (quoting S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 15 (2009)). 
 89 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West 2010). 
 90 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(3) (West 2010). 
 91 See Brian G. Santo, The False Claims Act: Analysis of the Recently Expanded 
Legislation on Qui Tam Actions and Related Impact on Whistleblowers, ABA HEALTH 
ESOURCE (July 2010), 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/Volume6_SE
2_Santo.html (citing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010)). 
 92 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
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substantially the same allegations or transactions alleged in the action or claim were 
publicly disclosed.”93   
In tandem with the Court’s new standard of discretion, the amended FCA 
employs a narrower definition of “publicly disclosed” information.94  The FCA now 
only bars actions brought in response to disclosures by federal sources or the media, 
leaving open the possibility of parasitic actions based on state or local publications.95  
The “original source” exception to the public disclosure bar, as previously 
mentioned,96 has even been expanded.97  Instead of requiring a whistleblower to 
provide “direct and independent knowledge” of allegedly fraudulent activity,98 the 
FCA now merely requires a whistleblower to contain “knowledge that is 
independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations.”99  By 
narrowing the FCA’s definition of “publicly disclosed” information and relaxing its 
definition of “original source,” the PPACA corrodes the “public disclosure bar.”  As 
a result, more qui tam relators are able to bring suits under the FCA, which 
contributes to the FCA’s widened scope of liability. 
Currently, the FCA establishes liability when any person or entity improperly 
receives funds from, or avoids payment to, the Federal government.100  In short, the 
FCA prohibits a contractor from: (1) knowingly presenting, or causing the 
presentation of a false claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly making, or 
causing to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or 
fraudulent claim; (3) conspiring to commit any violation of the FCA; (4) falsely 
certifying the type or amount of property to be used by the Government; (5) 
certifying receipt of property on a document without complete knowledge of the 
information’s truth; (6) knowingly buying Government property from an officer not 
under Government authorization, and; (7) knowingly making, using, or causing to be 
made or used a false record to avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or relinquish 
property to the Government.101 
                                                           
 93 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West 2010). 
 94 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(ii) (West 2010). 
 95 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii) (West 2010). 
 96 See supra Part II.B. 
 97 See Santo, supra note 91 (citing False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 
2010)). 
 98 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2009) amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) 
(West 2010).  
 99 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2010). 
 100 See generally 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2010). 
 101 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) (West 2010). 
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III.  THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S SHIFT TOWARD A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD: THE 
INEVITABLE ESCALATION OF TRANSACTIONAL COSTS AND NECESSARY CHANGES 
A.  The False Claims Act and its Shift Toward a Negligence Standard 
With FERA’s removal of Allison Engine’s intent requirement,102 the standard for 
liability under the False Claims Act resembles one of negligence.  Negligence 
employs a standard of care based upon the conduct of a “reasonable man of ordinary 
prudence.”103  Under a standard of negligence, an actor is expected to do the 
reasonable thing under the circumstances.104  The standard of conduct applied is an 
objective one, contrary to the subjective standard applied to intentional conduct.105  
In short, an actor or entity is negligent if: (1) the actor or entity owes a legal duty; (2) 
breaches that duty by falling below a reasonable standard of care; (3) there exists a 
causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) the conduct results in 
actual loss or damage to another.106 
To reiterate, the FCA only requires that a false claim be “material to” the 
government’s decision to approve payment,107 and “require[s] no proof of specific 
intent to defraud.”108  Congress developed the FERA “clarifications” of the FCA to 
halt the “types of fraud the FCA was intended to reach when it was amended in 
1986.”109  These “clarifications” are not without benefits; many false or fraudulent 
statements deserve recourse “without regard to whether the wrongdoer deals directly 
with the Federal Government . . . or with a third party contractor.”110  Congress’s 
motives, while well-intentioned, are shortsighted.  Under the FERA “clarifications,” 
liability may attach without regard to whether the defendant is an intentional 
“wrongdoer”111 in the first place.  Moreover, it appears that merely negligent 
defendants are now subject to liability under the amended FCA.   
                                                           
 102 See supra Part II.E.1. 
 103 PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 174 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 
1984).  Authored and often reedited by the late Dean Prosser and the late Professor Keeton, 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS has widely been recognized as the leading work on 
the subject of tort law. 
 104 Id. at 173-74. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 164-65. 
 107 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (West 2010); see also 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West 
2010) (attaching liability when statement is “material to an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly 
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government . . 
.”) (emphasis added). 
 108 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (West 2010). 
 109 S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 11 (2009).  
 110 Id. 
 111 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “wrongful” as “[c]haracterized by unfairness or 
injustice . . . [c]ontrary to law; unlawful . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1751 (9th ed. 
2009). 
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1.  Negligent Compliance and Voluntary Disclosure  
The Mayo Foundation (“Mayo”) is a current example of a negligent FCA 
defendant.112 Although negligent, Mayo is not necessarily a wrongdoer, and has not 
acted with any intent to defraud.  In September 2010, the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) intervened in a false claims action against Mayo pertaining to billing for 
services that were allegedly never performed.113  The whistleblowers that initiated 
the complaint are comprised of patients and family members.114  The government 
has intervened despite the fact that “Mayo says it refunded the government’s money 
three years ago before the organization even knew the lawsuit was in the works.”115   
In particular, the complaint alleges that, over the duration of 10 years, Mayo 
billed Medicare when it “prepared and examined water-based, blue-stained frozen 
slides”116 for pathology purposes.  Mayo also billed Medicare for the preparation, 
examination, and reports of “unfrozen slides,” which, according to the 
whistleblowers, Mayo never performed.117  For instance, the deceased wife of one of 
the whistleblowers underwent gallbladder surgery at Mayo Clinic in 1999.  “Mayo 
billed Medicare for both a frozen section pathology exam under surgical pathology 
code 88331-26 and for the preparation of an unfrozen permanent section slide . . . the 
examination of the unfrozen permanent section slide and the preparation of a report 
for such examination under surgical pathology code 88304-26.”118  Mayo’s records 
indicate the billing of both, even though “Code 88304-26 specifically excludes a 
frozen section exam from its definition. . . .”119 
Similar to the Reliable Rubber example,120 it appears as if Mayo’s unnecessary 
billing was merely a result of negligent compliance.  Although Mayo volunteered the 
information, it may have simply fallen below the reasonable standard of care in its 
coding efforts.  At most, Mayo is in breach of a contractual obligation.  In Mayo’s 
defense, complex coding and billing procedures often result in billing errors.  The 
practice of medicine, for example, “more than ever before, places greater demands 
on physicians to see more patients, provide more complex medical services and 
                                                           
 112 See Complaint, United States ex rel. Ketroser v. Mayo Found., Case No. 07-SC-4676 
RHK (AJB) (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Mayo Found.] (on file with author).  
Relators Ketroser, Latz, Smith, and Kennedy filed this complaint in 2008.  In September of 
2010, the Department of Justice decided to intervene in this qui tam action. See Youngstrom, 
infra note 113. 
 113 See Nina Youngstrom, Feds Join Lawsuit Against Mayo Foundation Despite its 
Voluntary Medicare Refund Years Ago, AIS’S HEALTH BUSINESS DAILY (Oct. 26, 2010, 11:06 
AM) (on file with author). 
 114 See Mayo Found., supra note 112, at 2. 
 115 Youngstrom, supra note 113, at 1. 
 116 Id. at 2 (Presumably, the slides were used, among other things, to diagnose and treat the 
patient.); see also Mayo Found., supra note 112, at 16-17. 
 117 Youngstrom, supra note 113, at 2. 
 118 Mayo Found., supra note 112, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 119 Id. (emphasis added). 
 120 See supra Part I. 
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adhere to stricter regulatory rules, leaving little time for coding and billing.”121  
Among the most common errors are “[b]illing for items or services not provided . . . 
. [d]ouble billing for the same service or item . . . .” and “[u]pcoding the level of 
service provided.”122  In addition, not all of these billing errors result in the over-
compensation of physicians.  Both health care and business analysts alike reveal 
“that physicians may not be receiving their fair share of health care dollars.”123  The 
American Medical Association states that declining reimbursements are “the 
dilemma facing many doctors today who have overhead costs that are going up faster 
than their revenue.”124  
A Mayo spokesperson responded to the allegations by stating “that Mayo 
officials discovered a billing error in 2007, corrected it and voluntarily refunded 
$242,711 to the government.”125  In addition, “[t]he error was identified and 
corrected long before Mayo was aware that a sealed complaint126 had been filed and 
before Mayo was notified that the Department of Justice was evaluating whether to 
become involved in the complaint[.]”127  Since Mayo discovered the misstep 
internally and voluntarily returned the money to the government, it would appear 
that the government did not suffer injury.  Even so, according to Ed Gaines, attorney 
and compliance specialist,128 “if you don’t go through the protocol, you don’t trump 
the ‘whistleblower effect[.]’”129  What is more, by failing to comply with voluntary 
self-disclosure protocol, Mayo will not be considered the original source of the 
blunder.130   
Mayo independently discovered and voluntarily disclosed the false information.  
Thus, it necessarily follows that Mayo did not act with the requisite “scienter” that 
the FCA set out to prohibit.131  In this case, it appears that mere negligence – a 
                                                           
 121 Diane L. Adams, Helen Norman & Valentine J. Burroughs, Addressing Medical Coding 
and Billing, Part II: A Strategy for Achieving Compliance, a Risk Management Approach for 
Reducing Coding and Billing Errors, 94, J. NAT’L MED. ASSOC. 430, 430. (June 2002). 
 122 Id. at 434. 
 123 Id. at 430. 
 124 Julie A. Jacob, Losing Proposition: When Doctors Take In Less Than What Goes Out, 
AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 7, 2002, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
amednews/2002/01/07/bisa0107.htm. 
 125 Youngstrom, supra note 113, at 2 (emphasis added) (The Mayo spokesperson further 
stated that, “[t]he error was identified and corrected long before Mayo was aware that a sealed 
complaint had been filed and before Mayo was notified that the Department of Justice was 
evaluating whether to become involved in the Complaint.”). 
 126 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(2) (West 2010) (“A copy of the complaint and written 
disclosure . . . shall be served on the Government . . . [.] The complaint shall . . . remain under 
seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.”). 
 127 Youngstrom, supra note 113, at 2-3. 
 128 See id. at 2 (According to the article, Ed Gaines is the “chief compliance officer for 
Medical Management Professionals in North Carolina.”).  
 129 Id. at 3. 
 130 See id. at 3-4. 
 131 See supra Part I. 
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breach of Mayo’s duty to comply with disclosure protocol – may result in liability 
under the unfastened provisions of the FCA.   
2.  Reasonable Belief of Compliance 
Without an intent requirement, courts may attach liability in situations where 
defendants reasonably believed they were compliant.132  In United States v. Chen, 
the court held defendant Dr. Chen liable under § 3729 of the False Claims Act.133  
The government alleged that the anesthesiologist and critical care expert knowingly 
fabricated “consultations” and submitted claims to Medicare for reimbursement.134  
At first glance, Dr. Chen’s situation appears to be the most typical form of a false 
claim allegation: one where the “defendant charged the government for more than 
was provided.”135  Unfortunately for Dr. Chen, what constitutes a “consultation” is 
confusing136 because there is no statutory or regulatory definition of the term.137  
Consequently, physicians often have trouble determining how to bill a consultation.   
For nearly five years, Dr. Chen billed Medicare for his consultations in the same 
manner.138  Medicare reimbursed him each time, thereby affirming that he was in 
compliance with Medicare billing practices.139  Specifically, Dr. Chen billed for 
catheterization, the area in which he specializes, and a consult on the same patient 
performed on the same day.140  The Unites States contended that the referring 
physicians did not request consultations or that Chen did not perform “separately 
identifiable services.”141  Each of the thirty-seven referring physicians, however, 
stated that he or she “requested a ‘consult’ from Dr. Chen.”142  But in most instances, 
the referring physicians requested Dr. Chen to perform catheter procedures, and did 
                                                           
 132 See generally United States v. Chen, 402 F. App’x 185 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 133 See generally id. 
 134 Id. at 187. 
 135 SYLVIA, supra note 4, at § 4:16 (noting that “[c]ongressional committees investigating 
fraud against the government prior to the adoption of the False Claims Act in 1863 reviewed 
countless examples of this type of conduct”). 
 136 United States v. Chen, 2:04-cv-00859-PMP-PAL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35845, at *5-
6, aff’d (D. Nev. May 30, 2006). The district court admitted that “this case involves 
regulations that . . . [are] unquestionably technical . . . [and] [t]heir meaning is ultimately the 
subject of judicial interpretation.” Id. at *23 (quoting United States ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons 
Co., 195 F.3d 457, 463 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944). 
 137 Medicare’s best attempt to explain what might constitute a consultation is “a type of 
service provided by a physician whose opinion or advice regarding evaluation and/or 
management of a specific problem is requested by another physician.”  Chen, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 35845, at *5-6. 
 138 See id. at *8-9. (Dr. Chen was sued for 3,544 claims made between January 1, 1999 and 
June 21, 2004.). 
 139 Id. at *9-11. 
 140 Id. at *8. 
 141 Id. at *24. 
 142 Id. at *16. 
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not expressly ask for Dr. Chen’s opinion or advice.143 Therefore, the court found 
that, “[a]lthough every referring doctor has testified that he requested a 
‘consultation,’ none has testified that he requested a consultation as defined by 
Medicare supporting Dr. Den’s billing of CPT Code 99255.”144 
Dr. Chen’s belief that he was in compliance with Medicare, and the FCA, 
seemed reasonable.  The term “consultation” is not precisely defined, and each 
referring physician stated that they both requested, and Dr. Chen performed, a 
consultation.145  Even if Dr. Chen’s belief was unreasonable, and he knowingly 
submitted false claims, Medicare compensated him for years without issue.146  If 
Medicare affirmed Dr. Chen’s practices by continued reimbursement, he was 
submitting subsequent claims in good faith.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s statement that 
an FCA defendant can escape liability “not because [his] interpretation was correct 
or ‘reasonable’ but because the good faith nature of [his] action forecloses the 
possibility that the scienter requirement is met”147 seems like lip service.  In no way 
did Dr. Chen act with the intention to injure the government.  Even more so, Dr. 
Chen’s actions were neither deceptive nor wrongful.  Even if Dr. Chen acted 
unreasonably by Medicare standards, he lacked the requisite scienter intended under 
the FCA.  Because there are other methods of recourse, the FCA should only sink its 
teeth into intentional, wrongful, or deceptive claims. 
3.  Negligent Returns of Government Overpayments 
After the enactment of FERA and PPACA, health care organizations risk severe 
sanctions under the reverse false claims provision.148  Where government programs – 
most notably federal healthcare programs like Medicare and Medicaid – make 
erroneous overpayments to a contractor, the burden soon shifts to the contractor to 
recognize and reconcile the government’s blunder.  In the health care field, 
“overpayments” include “any funds that a person receives or retains . . . to which the 
person, after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled.”149  After the overpayment is 
“identified,” contractors have a mere sixty days to report and return the erroneously 
rationed funds.150  Should a negligent oversight on the part of the contractor result in 
retention of these funds for longer than sixty days, the contractor faces treble 
damages.151  Furthermore, § 6402 of the PPACA legislation asserts that an 
                                                           
 143 Id. at *24. 
 144 Id. at *24-25 (emphasis added). 
 145 Id. at *5-6.  
 146 Id. at *9-11. 
 147 United States v. Chen, 402 F. App’x 185, 188 (9th Cir. 2010). (citing United States ex. 
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 148 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text. 
 149 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 150 Id. The provider must report and return a Medicare or Medicaid overpayment within 
sixty days of identification of the overpayment or the date the corresponding cost report is 
due, whichever is later. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(a). 
 151 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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overpayment retained after sixty days establishes an “obligation” under the FCA, 
thus exposing a provider to penalties of up to $10,000 per claim.152  Thus, even 
“retaining reimbursement received in good faith but later determined to be improper, 
such as the reimbursement for services provided pursuant to a referral prohibited by 
[federal law], could give rise to FCA liability.”153 
Compounding the confusion, the PPACA neglects to define the term 
“identified.”154  Must the contractor have actual knowledge of the overpayment?  
Will a reckless disregard for the identification of the overpayment suffice?  As such, 
“what constitutes an ‘identified’ overpayment is, at this point, unknown and likely to 
be the subject of significant litigation, unless sufficiently clarified by an agency 
rulemaking.”155  Navigating the murky waters of the FCA, along with other 
regulatory provisions, in order to determine when repayment obligations might exist 
is a daunting task.  In the healthcare context, the Fourth Circuit noted: 
There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions in question, 
involving the financing of Medicare and Medicaid, are among the most 
completely impenetrable texts within human experience.  Indeed, one 
approaches them at the level of specificity herein demanded with dread, 
for not only are they dense reading of the most tortuous kind, but 
Congress also revisits the area frequently, generously cutting and pruning 
in the process and making any solid grasp of the matters addressed merely 
a passing phase.156 
What has become increasingly clear, however, is that contractors face potentially 
crippling consequences under the modernized FCA without any intent to defraud the 
government. 
a.  What Constitutes an “Obligation”? 
After FERA’s enactment, the FCA attaches liability if there is an “obligation” to 
repay overpayments that are possessed “knowingly” and “improperly.”157  FERA 
“defines an ‘obligation’ as ‘an established duty, whether or not fixed’ arising from 
an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship, 
from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the 
retention of any overpayment.”158  Further complicating the matter is the fact that an 
affirmative statement or claim is no longer necessary to trigger liability.159  The new 
                                                           
 152 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a) (West 2010). 
 153 Robert G. Homchick, Lisa R. Hayward & David V. Marshall, FERA and the New World 
of False Claims Act Risks: Hypotheticals Help Illustrate What Constitutes “Knowing and 
Proper,” 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5, 8 (2010). 
 154 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(a) (2010). 
 155 Neely S. Griffith & Mollye M. Demosthenidy, Provider Uncertainties in the Refund of 
Overpayments, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (June 2010) (on file with author). 
 156 Rehab. Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 157 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West 2010). 
 158 Homchick et al., supra note 153, at 8 (quoting 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(3) (West 2010)). 
 159 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West 2010). 
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definition of “obligation” can cause considerable confusion in the health care 
industry because “identifying and confirming a potential legal duty to repay an 
overpayment in the health care regulatory scheme is no simple task.”160   
FERA does not elaborate on what constitutes an “established duty.”161  FERA’s 
legislative history does indicate, however, that Congress did not intend for a 
“contingent” obligation to fall within the purview of the FCA.162  Unfortunately, 
FERA’s definition of “obligation” has yet to be interpreted by the courts in many 
contexts.  Instead, contractors linger at the sufferance of the courts’ interpretation of 
exceedingly vague language, and correspondingly perplexing regulatory law.  As a 
result, contractors remain subject to arbitrary, paralyzing penalties for seemingly 
negligent activity. 
b.  When are Funds “Improperly” Retained?  
Another question that government contractors are forced to grapple with is 
whether or not funds have been “improperly” retained.  An example of this 
confusion can be illustrated through a hypothetical situation.163  Athlete 
Rehabilitation Center (“the Center”) contracts with Orthopedic Professional 
Physicians (“the Physicians”) to staff the Center’s orthopedic surgery department 
(“OSD”).  The Center bills for both the OSD facility fees and the physicians’ 
specialized services.  The physicians are revered among their orthopedic surgeon 
colleagues, and widely considered to be the most skilled coalition in their profession.  
The quality of the physicians’ work performed in the OSD is among the highest in 
the nation, and the Center has received widespread praise.   
The physicians, however, have not reached the same level of mastery in 
meticulously maintaining accurate documentation of services provided.  The Center 
recently conducted an internal audit, revealing that documentation for thirty-five 
percent of the claims submitted for orthopedic services (whether facility or 
professional components) contained deficiencies.  While the severity of the 
respective documentation deficiencies varied from claim to claim, the audit results 
confirmed that all services were, in fact, performed.  To ensure that these problems 
do not occur again in the future, the Center provides documentation and coding 
training to the physicians.  Given the unclear language implemented by the FERA 
amendments to the FCA, it is not clear whether the Center has “knowingly and 
improperly” retained overpayments. 
A whistleblower privy to the deficient documentation may bring an action by 
arguing that the documentation errors make the claims “improper.”  If the 
whistleblower succeeds in its argument, it may show that the reimbursement the 
Center received for the properly rendered services constitutes an “overpayment,” 
thereby exposing the Center to FCA liability.  In this situation, the physicians 
performed superlatively, simply falling below a reasonable standard of care in 
documenting such services.  It is not even clear that the documentation oversights 
resulted in the Center or the physicians being overpaid.  More importantly, neither 
the physicians nor the Center acted with intent to defraud the government.  
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Additionally, after an internal audit, the Center took steps to correct the problem by 
implementing a training program for the physicians.  Consequently, imposing heavy 
damages and excessive penalties for a negligent compliance with overly vague 
provisions is illogical and will yield counterintuitive results.   
c.  What Does it Mean to Have “Identified” an Overpayment?  
Confusion also surrounds the issue of what it means to have “identified” an 
overpayment.  Recall that, under the PPACA, a health care contractor is required to 
report and return any overpayment of Medicare or Medicaid funds no later than sixty 
days after the overpayment has been “identified.”164  The PPACA fails to elaborate 
as to when an overpayment has been “identified.”  Of chief concern is what state of 
mind is required to “identify” an overpayment.  For example, must the contractor 
have actual knowledge of the overpayment, or is “information that reasonably 
suggests there has been an overpayment” sufficient?165  Because it is unclear what 
constitutes identification of an overpayment, it is necessarily unclear when the sixty 
day limitation provided by the PPACA begins to run.  Consequently, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for health care organizations to avoid FCA liability through 
timely reports and returns of uncertain “overpayments.” 
B.  Raising the Cost of Doing Business with Both Contractors and the Government 
Exposing companies to increased liability necessarily raises the price of doing 
business with those companies and the federal government.  To combat the risk of 
liability, companies are forced to allocate additional resources in several areas; 
namely, compliance, arbitration, litigation, settlement negotiations, and the time 
necessary to research these situations.166  In disputes involving complex 
presumptions of liability, expenditures for legal counsel can range between one and 
ten million dollars, sometimes more.167  Smaller firms, similar to the hypothetical 
Reliable Rubber,168 may not have the means to guard against FCA allegations or to 
“implement expansive compliance systems.”169   
Cases where the government declines to intervene have proven particularly 
burdensome on companies and contractors, resulting in company expenditures 
disproportionate to the relators’ recovery.170  A study of thirty-eight cases shows that 
when whistleblowers chose to go at it alone, the average recovery was a mere 
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$97,223, compared to an average cost to defend the action of $1,431,660.171  Even 
more striking is the fact that, as of 2009, the government declined to intervene in 
more than two-thirds of the cases.172  Of those two-thirds, a majority of the cases 
were dismissed, “incurring costs for the parties without benefitting the public.”173   
Even more striking is the fact that courts may award penalties even absent any 
financial loss to the government.  In United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse 
Savannah River Company, the district court awarded civil penalties of $195,000 and 
attorney’s fees totaling more than $144,000 even though the relator failed to prove 
the government incurred an actual loss.174  The defendant neglected to divulge a 
conflict of interest when seeking a contract with the Department of Energy, but the 
misrepresentation resulted in no loss to the government.175  Instead, the Fourth 
Circuit attached liability on the ground that misrepresentation had “negatively 
affected the integrity of the bidding process.”176  Logically, these companies and 
contractors are forced to raise prices in order to subsidize the increased costs of 
fruitless litigation.177 
Similarly, the increase in FCA litigation also heightens the cost of doing business 
with the government.178  Proponents of expanded FCA liability validly point out that 
“the costs of defending against unsuccessful qui tam suits are recoverable against the 
government.”179  In other words, in the case of dismissal or a victory for the defense, 
the defendant can recover the cost of the litigation.  In many instances, however, the 
government has reimbursed the defendant in excess of what the whistleblower stood 
to gain on his own.180  As a result, a survey suggests that the Department of Defense 
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spends significantly more in reimbursing contractor defendants than the government 
recovers under the FCA in like situations.181  It is undisputed that the FCA, in many 
instances, is an effective and necessary weapon in combating fraud against the 
government.182  The FCA, however, can be a more efficient tool if its focus is 
narrowed to exclude negligence as a basis for liability. 
C.  Implicit Negligence Standard Causes Other Policy Implications and 
Unwarranted Burdens 
The wrath of the vast FCA does not limit itself to smaller organizations.  Boeing, 
for example, is the largest United States exporter in terms of value, and is the third 
largest defense contractor in the world.183  Boeing’s Defense, Space & Security 
division was responsible for fifty-one percent of the company’s income in 2008.184  
Attaching liability to Boeing for conduct merely resembling a breach of contract or 
negligence would have disastrous implications.   
Potentially, the government may lose one of its most important contractors.  In 
addition, putting Boeing’s defense division under could result in massive job loss.  
Furthermore, the loss of its defense division, because of its value to the company, 
would have a substantial impact on Boeing’s other divisions.  Given FERA’s 
economic-driven purpose,185 job loss of this magnitude is manifestly undesirable.  
Thus, narrowing the FCA’s focus to exclude negligence or mistake will better serve 
FERA’s economic agenda. 
Further compounding the issue is the burden the increase in liability will 
necessarily place on federal court dockets.  Even before FERA, “[t]he sheer number 
of potential parties to FCA liability has already increased with the passage of the 
economic stimulus bills.”186  After the FERA amendments widened the scale of 
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liability, “the potential exists for almost any business or company to be liable under 
the FCA.”187  In combining these amendments with “the other FERA amendments 
that provide for expanded protection available to whistleblowers and qui tam 
relators, the potential is great for a flood of FCA litigation.”188   
IV.  CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A POTENT, YET MORE 
EFFICIENT WEAPON TO COMBAT FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
Instead of providing for clarification, the FERA’s amendments to the FCA – 
specifically its removal of the “intent” requirement and expansion of the reverse 
false claims provision – ensure a broadened scope of liability for private entities that 
conduct business with the government, whether directly or indirectly.  In an attempt 
to remedy the loopholes recent Supreme Court decisions have created for 
contractors, Congress has instead created loopholes for relators and whistleblowers.  
Moreover, a law that was initially designed to punish those who intentionally 
defraud the Government now appears to employ a quasi-negligence standard. 
Consequently, the FERA amendments to the FCA will expose organizations that use 
government funds to unwarranted liability. 
Congress should again amend the False Claims Act.  This time, however, the 
legislation should expressly exclude mere negligence as a basis for liability.  Several 
state legislatures have included such language into their state versions of the False 
Claims Act.189  Minnesota, for example, does not attach liability to “a person who 
acts merely negligently, inadvertently, or mistakenly.”190  Florida excludes “innocent 
mistake[s]” from the Act’s ambit of reprimand.191  Amending the FCA to exclude 
negligence and mistake as bases for liability is consistent with Congress’s goal “to 
protect from fraud the Federal assistance and relief funds expended in response to 
our current economic crisis.”192  Moreover, this amendment would prevent the FCA 
from attaching liability to parties lacking the requisite scienter, such as Reliable 
Rubber, Mayo Foundation, Dr. Chen, and even Boeing.  For these innocent, although 
negligent parties, recourse lies in a simple claim of negligence or breach of contract.  
In turn, the government’s effort will be more focused on those who need deterring. 
Similarly, Congress could effectuate its purpose by amending the language of the 
FCA to attach liability to conduct done in “bad faith.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “bad faith” as “dishonesty of belief or purpose.”193  Pursuant to this 
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definition, courts may find entities liable when the entity has presented a false claim 
or obtained government funds with a dishonest belief or purpose.  Here, too, 
Congress would ensure that courts attach liability to deserving corporate entities, 
without unfairly penalizing parties who merely act unreasonably in their compliance 
procedures or in filing claims.  After all, these are not the parties that need deterring. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Civil False Claims Act was not intended to remedy every wrong that a 
government contractor may commit.194  The FCA and its extreme penalties were 
designed to deter a specific category of offenders: those who knowingly, 
deceptively, and wrongfully defraud the government.  If left unchanged, the FCA’s 
imprecise language will result in courts applying a negligence standard.  If the 
FCA’s threshold for liability were to erode to a negligence standard, the cost of 
doing business with the government and contractors would necessarily rise.  
Furthermore, the number of people willing to do business with the government 
would dwindle.  Congress must take heed of the states, and expressly exclude 
negligence and mere mistake as bases for liability under the federal False Claims 
Act. 
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